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The "Income-Variance" Risk Factor and 
Jones & Laughlin v. Pfeifer Guidelines for the 
Calculation of Present Value 
Char les H. Breeden * 
I. Introduction 
Papers that discuss the appropriate discount rate to be used on calculating 
the present value of future losses are so numerous that writing such papers 
could be characterized as a cottage industry. For a smattering of contributions, 
see for example, Havrilesky(1988), Pelaez (1989 and 1997), Albrecht and 
Moorhouse (1989), Nowak, (1991), Bell and Taub (1990 and 1999), Haydon and 
Webb (1992), Bonham and La Croix (1991), Haslag, Nieswiadomy, and Slottje, 
(1994) and Ewing, Payne, and Piette (2001). Related articles discuss projected 
earnings growth rates and the "net" discount rate that is the residual of offset-
ting an earnings growth rate against a discount rate. There is also the issue of 
"real" or inflation-free discount rates versus "nominal" discount rates. 
A recent exchange in the literature directs our attention to the variance 
and not just the level, of inflation forecasts and implications for the considera-
tion of risk. This exchange suggests a consideration of the variance of income 
itself over the course of a typical worklife and the question arises: Has the ex-
istence of potential year-to-year variance in projected earnings of an injured vic-
tim been sufficiently understood and accounted for in our calculations of pre-
sent value? Believing the answer to this question to be in the negative, this pa-
per attempts to state and clarify issues regarding this "income-variance" risk 
factor. 
The proximate cause of the comments ventured here was an exchange in 
the Fall 1999 number of the Litigation Economics Digest between Professors 
Bell and Taub (comment) on the one hand, and Professor Ireland (response) on 
the other hand. The issues revolved around "risk adjustments" in damage cal-
culations of present value. Ireland (1997) had argued that since inflation risk 
involves both upside and downside exposure (unanticipated variance in actual 
inflation over forecast period), then unanticipated variance in actual inflation 
Over the time period of the forecast merely increases the variance, not the 
mean, of future returns and hence does not require any adjustment to the dis-
count rate. Ireland further argued that a default premium for termination of 
the income stream needn't be considered in present value calculations because 
such calculations already contain an adjustment for survival and workforce 
attachment probabilities. To additionally burden expected future earnings 
would involve double counting. Bell and Taub take issue with both of these 
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contentions in their short comment by citing a principle of finance that only 
future cash flow streams that are "certain" are entitled to discounting at a 
"risk-free" rate. Stated in the opposite manner, non-certain returns require at 
least some form of adjustment for risk, a risk "premium." Ireland replies that 
case law (especially Jones & Laughlin v. Pfeifer) requires risk-free discount 
rates and that any uncertainty regarding the income stream should be re-
flected in the projected level or length of income. 
Before turning to a fuller discussion of respective arguments, it is worth 
pointing out the essential agreement in approach of the two sides. Both parties 
acknowledge that in matters of present value calculation, "the real problem ... 
is one of accounting for all factors that might limit a future earning stream" 
(Ireland, 1999, p.157). Thus there is no disagreement that the present value of 
future earnings should reflect the potentials for reduced earnings flow due to 
death or incapacity. There is also a mutual understanding that riskiness asso-
ciated with the earning stream should be accounted for in some fashion al-
though the precise method (by reductions to the earning assumption itself or 
by considering a higher non risk-free discount rate) is itself debatable. 
II. The Main Argument 
The idea raised in Bell and Taub's comment that concerns us here is that 
in the typical present value calculation, "no adjustment is made to recognize 
the uncertainty of future productivity growth." Any variance in such a growth 
rate over the life of the lost income would constitute a form of uncertainty and 
would thus potentially provide a basis for reduction in present value via a 
higher, non-risk free discount rate. This general perspective is not novel with 
Bell and Taub. Earlier, Margulis (1992) had argued essentially the same point 
with respect to the level of the income stream rather than the growth rate of 
income. He had argued for "parity in risk," a finance term, in the valuation of 
future loss streams. Margulis maintained that the only proper arena in which 
to utilize a risk-free discount rate is in the projection of a risk-free and con-
stant earning stream. All earnings projections that involve some uncertainty 
over the year-to-year earning level or growth rate are to be valued at a non-
risk free discount rate. It is noteworthy that Margulis' numerous references did 
not include an article from any Economics and Law journal nor did they in-
clude a reference to Journal of Forensic Economics. His foundation sources 
were from finance and his central notion of the requirement of "risk parity" is a 
principle of finance. Later, Biederman and Baesemann (1996), responding to a 
comment by Albrecht (1992), echoed Margulis' point and attempted to show 
that if compensatory damages are the goal, then principles of financial eco-
nomics compel us to employ non-risk free discount rates except for the unlikely 
cases where individuals are indifferent to risk. Like Margulis, they ultimately 
ground their argument in the finance literature. 
Principles of Finance and Forensic Economists' Calculations 
Thus a principle of finance (that only "certain" future payment streams are 
to be valued at the risk-free discount rate) is cited and utilized by Margulis, 
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Biederman and Baesemann, and Bell and Taub to comment on the proper dis-
count rate. If it is proper to apply the finance principle to the calculation of 
present value of lost earning streams, then current practice of discounting 
earning streams by risk-free government bond or bill rates becomes suspect. 
For a given expected value (e.g. median or most likely earnings) forecast, dis-
counting at the US Treasury Bond rate would imply that the earnings were a 
"certain" stream (absent any other adjustment). Discounting uncertain future 
earnings at a non-risk free corporate bond rate would seem to account for the 
possibility of uncertainty of payments as that rate reflects a premium for the 
possibility of default. 
In their discussions of "factors that limit a future earning stream" (Ireland 
p.157) and "factoring in the problem of non-survival and non-participation" 
(Bell and Taub p.154), both sides are clearly responding to the same ultimate 
goal of a fair and accurate measurement of damages. Ireland states "it seems 
logical to account for all risks to the earning stream itself or to account for all 
risks with premia in the discount rate" (p.158). 
In Ireland's mind, Bell and Taub conflate risk adjustment strategies. If the 
calculation has explicitly reduced earnings for death and workforce attachment 
probabilities, then uncertainty over earnings has been accounted for and im-
posing a risk premium on the discount rate would "double-burden" income pro-
jections. Further, Ireland feels that Pfeifer and case law demand the use of 
risk-free discount rates, thus present value calculations must necessarily use 
LPE adjustments to earning streams to factor in all other relevant kinds of 
risk. This is the central question between Ireland and Bell and Taub. 
Proper Risk Adjustment: To Earning Stream or to Discount Rate? 
Ireland's presumption that risk-free rates are required by case law leads 
directly to his conclusion that all other risks must be folded into adjustments 
to the earning stream. "The important point is that Pfeifer sets a standard that 
is applied in many legal venues, both state and federal, regardless of the 
"rightness" or "wrongness" of the Pfeifer court's opinion regarding discount 
rates." (Ireland, p.157) Yet the Pfeifer standard of "risk-free" discount rates 
closes the door on a consideration of any type of uncertainty in income stream 
not translatable into an adjustment to the length or level of the income stream. 
Clearly this allows consideration of the chief uncertainties confronted by foren-
sic economists related to income projection, namely their expected length, and 
their expected level. LPE adjustments in fact allow uncertainty related to the 
length of worklife to be collapsed into calculations of the level of earnings. 
The important point here is that if uncertainty exists related to the con-
stancy of projected income growth rates through time, or uncertainty over the 
level of income year-to-year, then another dimension of risk is present and may 
need to be accounted for in some way. The variance can be either period-to-pe-
riod changes in income or in a variance in the growth rate over the forecast 
period, whatever its mean value. The risk of income variance is separate from 
the risk of income cessation, although it would be fair to interpret temporary 
income cessation as an extreme form of variance. While there may be alternate 
ways to account for it in a present value calculation and while its inclusion 
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mayor may not be warranted on other grounds, it seems clear that an income 
stream that fluctuates about a mean level or mean growth rate is less desirable 
than the income stream with a constant level or growth rate. The complex set 
of characteristics that distinguishes small company from large company in-
comes no doubt includes the observed greater unpredictability of small com-
pany returns year-to-year. Thus the extra return required by investors to hold 
small company stocks reflects their perception of risk. Risk can thus in this 
context be defined as uncertainty about the course of future events that would 
translate into an observed differential in return of the sort that divides average 
returns from large company returns from small company. 
With Ireland and many others relying on the language of the Pfeifer deci-
sion for direction on matters of present value calculations, the decision de-
serves a further examination. If the principle of finance is correctly applied to 
forensic economists' present value economic calculations, then it remains to be 
established that the legal framework within which forensic economists operate 
allows the finance principle into evidence. Although the direction of US Su-
preme Court opinion in science matters after the trilogy of Daubert, Joiner, 
and Kumho Tire is clearly toward having the "best science" represented in 
courtrooms, existing rules of evidence still apply. 
The Pfeifer Decision 
The decision in Pfeifer touches on several key elements of the forensic 
economist's calculation of present value of income streams. 
1. Inflation 
2. Taxes 
3. Growth rate assumption 
4. Discount rate assumption 
5. Length of loss period 
6. The type of investment for the awarded lump sum 
Inflation 
In paragraph (d) on page 524 (as a referee pointed out, differing reporting 
systems use different page numbers creating a challenge for the reader fol-
lowing a different reporting service version), the court makes clear its under-
standing of the need for consistency in the handling of inflation in the earnings 
forecast and the discount rate forecast. "As long as inflation continues, the 
amount of the 'offset' against the market rate should be chosen on the basis of 
the same factors that are used to estimate the lost stream of future earnings." 
(continued to page 525) The court demonstrates an understanding of the dif-
ference between real and nominal interest rates. "The relevant real interest 
rate is the difference between the short term market interest rate in a given 
year and the average rate of price inflation during that same year." (page 543, 
in footnote 26 continuing from page 542.) 
Taxes 
The court also referenced Liepelt regarding the use of after-tax income. 
The federal jurisdiction required that losses be computed on an after-tax basis. 
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Loss Period 
In this case, the court abided by the use of age 65 as this was agreed to by 
the two parties. 
Growth Rate 
On page 536, the Court refers to productivity increases as "a permanent 
feature of the national economy" and makes clear that such increases will in-
crease workers' wages and should be considered in calculating the proper 
award. 
Discount Rates 
On page 537, the Court gives its fullest discussion of discount rates. Refer-
ring to and quoting liberally from the standard citation, Chesapeake & Ohio 
Railway Company u. Kelley, the Court writes "the ascertained future benefits 
ought to be discounted in the making up of the award" (Chesapeake, p.490). 
They go on to state "The discount rate should be based on the rate of interest 
that would be earned on "the best and safest investments" (Chesapeake, p. 
490). They conclude that (their words, not Chesapeake) the injured worker "is 
entitled to a risk-free stream of future income to replace his lost wages; there-
fore the discount rate should not reflect the market's premium for investors 
who are willing to accept some risk of default" (Pfeifer, p. 537). 
It is noteworthy that here they explicitly mention the risk of default, the 
permanent cessation of income, and not the risk of variance in income from 
period to period (higher than average some years and lower others). The cessa-
tion of income including the probability of any premature cessation due to 
death can be, and routinely is, factored into the present value calculation by an 
LPE adjustment. If we distinguish between the cessation of income and the 
irregular nature of income that does not experience cessation, we can see that 
the court in Pfeifer did not directly address the "variance of income" dimension 
that arises in the exchange between Bell and Taub and Ireland. This is the ba-
sis for my conclusion that Pfeifer "sees" neither the issue of income variance 
nor the implications for discount rates, and it cannot be taken as the definitive 
legal ruling on an issue that it does not specifically address. In addition, if in-
deed the Pfeifer Court failed to see the issues with the eyes of modern finance 
and economic theory, must it remain so for eternity? Is not the overarching de-
sire of the Supreme Court, as revealed in Daubert and elsewhere, that sound 
principles of modern science hold sway in courts of law? Is it not the responsi-
bility of forensic economists to put forth their best notions of what is correct, 
and let the rules of evidence be settled by jurists and legal writers? Is this an 
instance of "path dependence [as] an important phenomenon in law" (Posner, 
2001 p. 157)? If so, then perhaps we should follow Judge Posner in interpreting 
"law ... as a servant of [the] social need" (p. 159) of precision in damage meas-
urement. 
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Type of investment 
The Court identifies that the discount rate should reflect a rate of interest 
"that would be earned on "the best and safest investment" (referring again at 
page 537 to Chesapeake, page 491.) At page 541, it is noted that Canada uses 
7% return to long-term investments minus an inflation forecast. It is also noted 
that Australia uses a (presumably risk-free) "2% real market rate." The Court's 
terminology of ''best'' and "safest," while sensible on the surface, upon reflec-
tion is subject to multiple interpretations. Interpreting "best" in terms of safety 
renders the phrase completely redundant. Yet other interpretations see "best" 
as an investment that is within the management capabilities of the average in-
jury victim or reflective of the victim's ideal risk/return profile. Interpreting 
''best'' to mean the highest yielding investment renders the phrase contradic-
tory because higher (than risk-free) yields can only be achieved by the assump-
tion of some risk. 
On page 548, after rejecting price inflation forecasts and reciting the fa-
mous quote about "not converting trial courts into graduate economics semi-
nars," the Court goes on to say "it is necessary to choose an appropriate below-
market rate of interest" (my emphasis.) They go on to state that trial courts 
using between 1% and 3% would rarely be reversed. After this, three para-
graphs below, they state that, after accounting for inflation and societal factors 
affecting wage increases, "then these wage growth factors should be set off 
against the market interest rate in an estimation of future price inflation" (p. 
548.) 
From the snapshot view of Pfeifer, it becomes apparent that the Supreme 
Court used the case to address several specifics relating to the forensic econo-
mists' present value calculation. It is also apparent that while displaying much 
understanding, the Court also displays some confusion and leaves a number of 
important issues subject to varied interpretation. While at times giving the 
instructions cited by Ireland regarding risk-free discount rates, the Court also 
creates confusion by referring to both "market" and "below-market" interest 
rates, by displaying both the "return on investment" and the "reduced future 
earning stream" interpretations, and by considering the cessation of income 
streams but not their possible variance. Thus Pfeifer supports Ireland's inter-
pretation and at the same time provides ample leeway for alternative interpre-
tations as well. 
III. A Hypothetical Illustration 
An Example of Two Earning Streams 
Consider an illustrative hypothetical case involving twin brothers of equal, 
innate productivity characteristics, identical training with degrees in account-
ing from the same institution with identical grade point averages. They under-
take similar job searches but brother B chooses to go to work in the Bursar's 
office at the college from which they graduated and brother A decides to be-
come a free-lance financial advisor specializing in athletes in professional 
sports. Let us further assume that rents are fully dissipated at the margin so 
that the expected lifetime earnings of the twin brothers are identical. 
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While the means of lifetime earnings streams are identical, the nature of 
the respective employment situations as constructed guarantees that the stan-
dard deviations of year-to-year earnings would be significantly different. 
In the case of the wrongful death of the twins, the forensic economist ig-
noring the effects of income variance would give an identical present value for 
these two lifetime earning streams. To a financial analyst utilizing a capital 
asset pricing model and following the principle that only "certain" cash flows 
are to be valued at risk-free discount rates, the streams would be given differ-
ent current values reflecting the differing variances of the income streams. A 
risk adjustment would be suggested that increased the discount rate (a pre-
mium would be added) and thus lowered the present value of lifetime earnings 
for the free-lance financial advisor, brother A. 
Differences in the discount rate applied to the twin brothers' future income 
will then result in differences in the present value of lifetime earnings under 
this scenario, even when all other dimensions are identical as per construction. 
Margulis, Biederman and Baesemann, and Bell and Taub are claiming that 
well-known principles of finance require that the risky income stream be dis-
counted at a non risk-free rate and accordingly, that a lower present value 
lump sum award be given. Professor Ireland responds that even if using risk-
free rates is questionable from a purely computational standpoint, it is none-
theless required by the Supreme Court (in Pfeifer). Unless some method can be 
found by which the uncertainty of income variation can be collapsed into an 
adjustment of the level or length of assumed income, then the two income 
streams with identical median earnings level are to be valued identically by 
Professor Ireland. 
A table showing hypothetical income streams was suggested by a referee 
and might clarify the issue. Consider the two brothers, A and B and let the 
values reflect the probability distributions of their earnings. The standard ap-
proach interprets "expected value" as a certainty equivalent stream and dis-
counts accordingly. Yet brother A's likely income stream surely would have 
exhibited greater uncertainty (here defined as variance year-to-year) than 
brother B's steady university wages. The crux of contention can be stated as a 
question: Should the two lost income present values be identically calculated? 
Professor Ireland would seem to answer in the affirmative and Professors Bell 
and Taub in the negative. If these two brothers projected incomes were instead 
the projected returns to two companies facing differing competitive conditions, 
then would the market for equities place a lower value on Company A in rec-
ognition of the risk, however precisely defined? 
Table 1 
Income in Income in Income in 
Individual year 1 Probability year 2 Probability year 3 Probability 
A $60 .2 $80 .2 $60 .2 
$100 .6 $100 .6 $100 .6 
$140 .2 $120 .2 $140 .2 
B $100 1.0 $100 1.0 $100 1.0 
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IV. Related and Unresolved Issues 
Investment Returns or Discount Rate Only 
The issue of discount rates is clouded by the distinction between inter-
preting the discount rate as a reduction of future losses to present value or as a 
projection of earnings on the awarded lump sum. It has been understood, at 
least at the Circuit Court of Appeals level, that the discount rate can be under-
stood as an earning rate on the invested lump sum. In Shin- Tao u. McDonnell 
Douglas Corp., the Court held that "post-judgment losses ... are to be dis-
counted to present value in order to offset future earning power of a present 
lump sum award for future losses" (at p. 52.) While this addressed only post-
judgment losses, the logic is clearly applicable to all discounted present value 
sums. If this conceptualization of a present value damages calculation is ap-
propriate, it supports the consideration of non-risk free discount rates. An al-
ternative viewpoint holds that we should view the present value calculation as 
independent from any investment plans for the awarded lump sum. This per-
spective tends to minimize concerns over risk-adjusted discount rates and rec-
ommends reliance upon a risk-free rate. 
Best and Safest 
The discussion may be thought to turn on the definition of "best and safest" 
investments, a phrase from Chesapeake, cited as authority in Pfeifer. A "best" 
investment would mean something very different from a "safest" investment 
thus the language of the legally controlling precedent sets up confusion by 
failing to appreciate the unavoidable tradeoff between best and safest invest-
ments. As noted above, depending on one's interpretation, the terminology 
upon which the legal principle is based is subject to multiple interpretations 
and can be viewed as being either contradictory or redundant. 
V. Arguments for Ignoring Income or Productivity Variance 
There are some standard efficiency arguments for ignoring income vari-
ance-risk adjustments in the selection of a discount rate, even if the theoretical 
case for its consideration is granted. First, consider the parallels with the effi-
ciency argument for punitive damages. If some accidents or tortfeasors are un-
detected or if some elements of economic damages are systematically excluded 
from consideration in the litigation process, then a degree of "overcompensa-
tion" may be seen as a partial correction, "second-best" arguments aside. Two 
large categories of potential damage under-assessment exist in the present sys-
tem of tort law. Regarding undetected injuries, although the common law doc-
trine that the "action dies with the man" is no longer controlling, it is still true 
that US law of wrongful death, like most civil law, relies on self-enforcement 
by the aggrieved parties. Thus losses are claimed by and awarded to, survivors 
(Wisconsin is a "loss-to-survivors" state) or an estate (the alternative is "loss-
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to-estate"). This means that the gravel truck company that negligently kills 
twin brother B, father of five, will face lifetime earning damages payable to the 
survivors or the surviving estate while the gravel truck company that negli-
gently kills brother A, a bachelor with no dependent relatives, will face only 
the possibility of criminal charges and no civil liability. 
Secondly, even if there are survivors to press claims of lost support and in-
heritance, it is well known (Posner, 1998, p.215) that the economic value of life 
of a decedent, to the decedent, is omitted from the calculation of pecuniary 
wrongful death damages. There is thus a partial misstatement of such dam-
ages in wrongful death litigation in most jurisdictions when viewed from the 
standpoint of social value. Considering the likely imprecision involved in the 
assessment of damages under current practice from this and other theoretical 
considerations of social utility, the urgency of attempts to fine tune the dis-
count rate by adjusting for risk variance is undermined. 
Investment Returns vs. Lifetime Earnings: 
Is the Finance Principle Applicable? 
Despite the counter arguments, it is this writer's opinion that the likely 
variance in income streams being projected is an item bearing on the selection 
of a proper discount rate and is appropriate for further analysis by forensic 
economists. Is it fair to value a lifetime of income stream payments for labor 
services the same wayan investor would value a similar stream of payments 
emanating from a financial or business asset? In one sense no, since there is no 
comparable market for a person's lifetime earnings in any manner equivalent 
or similar to the market for financial or business assets. Yet the same conver-
sion of a flow of likely income into a stock of present value lump sum wealth is 
necessitated by the common law of tort damages. The absence of a ready "ex-
plicit" valuation of lifetime earnings makes such calculations more problematic 
in comparison say, to a business or commercial property valuation. But this 
issue is present whether or not the separate issue of a potential for risk premi-
ums for income variance is confronted. 
While there may seem to be no parallel between the fluctuating returns of 
equity investments and the steady raises enjoyed, for example by government 
or union contract workers, there is similarly no comparability between the 
earnings of a commission-only municipal bond salesman with highly variable 
earnings and the predictably reliable bond interest payments of a U.S. Treas-
ury bond. Perhaps a tailoring of likely earnings variability and investment in-
strument is feasible. Given sufficient longitudinal income data, perhaps a 
"beta" of income variability could be developed patterned after the "beta" of 
investment return volatility. It would seem reasonable to introduce a higher 
discount rate reflecting equity yields in the case of the commission-only mu-
nicipal bond seller whose income is seen to fluctuate. In the case of a secure 
government worker with a history of steady raises on the other hand, a calcu-
lation of present value based on risk-free returns might be given more weight. 
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VI. Conclusion 
The entire discussion above could be rendered moot if the end result of con-
sidering risk-adjusted discount rates does not result in substantial differences 
in present value calculations in comparison to using risk-free discount rates. 
However, the results of introducing risk-adjusted discount rates will usually be 
material. Consider again the commission-only municipal bond seller with an 
historic income fluctuating between $300,000 and $800,000 annually. Drawing 
parallels is not perfect but average returns to small company stocks certainly 
provide a starting point. The variability of commissions to a salesperson easily 
compares to the volatility of earnings of a small company. The latest Ibbotson 
and Associates yearbook puts long-term average nominal yields at 12.5% for 
small company stocks and 11.0% for large company stocks. In comparison to 
average nominal risk-free U.S. Treasury Bond yields on the order of 5%, pre-
sent value differences can be substantial over long time periods. It is difficult 
to imagine that the Supreme Court's desire to see good science in the court-
room as revealed by its Daubert decision would allow it to exclude a forensic 
economist's calculation that reflected risk-adjusted discount rates where such 
rates were supported by a consensus of the relevant scientific community. 
On the other hand, in the concluding section of Pfeifer, the Supreme Court 
majority writes that they are not suggesting that the trial judge "should em-
bark on a search for "delusive exactness" (p. 552, apparently a Holmesian 
phrase). In stating this, they may be implicitly acknowledging the well-known 
economic principle that, given a positive marginal cost of greater precision, 
some imprecision may be optimal. While this is indisputable as a general prin-
ciple, it is up to forensic economists to consider further fine-tuning of the dis-
count rate such as is being tentatively considered here. 
Judge Richard Posner has written in economic terms about the Supreme 
Court's law-making. He compares a Supreme Court precedent to productive 
social capital, having a supply function (quantity supplied is modeled as a 
function of the degree of social conflict or uncertainty) and exhibiting deprecia-
tion over time. He points out that Supreme Court law is and should be the 
most general and durable of all law and that when Supreme Court law be-
comes specific, it sacrifices its durability and longevity (Posner, p. 587-96). 
Perhaps in Pfeifer, by clearly and specifically declaring that "below-market" 
"risk-free" discount rates of between "1% and 3%" are to be employed by foren-
sic economists, the Supreme Court has pursued a "delusive exactness." Fol-
lowing Posner's analysis of Supreme Court decisions as legal "capital," we may 
however conclude that Pfeifer's instructions for present value are overly spe-
cific and will quickly depreciate in the face of legal challenges, academic 
discussions, and in light of the varied and constantly evolving practice of foren-
sic economists. Bell and Taub's and Ireland's contributions and the present 
comment have all hopefully made a substantial contribution to this continuing 
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